Procurement and Information Feedback by Dufwenberg, Martin & Gneezy, Uri
Procurement and Information Feedback
Martin Dufwenberg
* & Uri Gneezy**
March 4, 2000
Abstract: A government that regularly procures the services of construction companies
wants to minimize its costs. The instrument it can use is the level of information feedback
given to the firms in the market. Theoretically, the competition between firms is supposed
to drive prices to the lowest possibility, independently of the information feedback.
We design an experiment in which firms participate in a first price sealed-bid
auction. Interaction takes place in 10 periods according to a random matching mechanism,
and we control for the level of information feedback firms receive after each period. It
turns out that when firms are informed about the losing bids in previous periods, prices are
higher than the theoretical prediction. However, when firms do not receive this
information prices converge towards the theoretical prediction. We suggest that a
phenomenon of price signaling may be important for explaining these results.
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1. Introduction
Suppose you are a government contractor who regularly procures the services of
construction companies. For each task to be done you ask private firms to submit sealed
bids specifying the price for which they are willing to execute the job. The firm submitting
the lowest price wins the contract. Different firms compete on each contracting occasion.
You would like to keep prices as low as possible. The firms' behavior can be influenced
through your agency's policy on how to disclose information about prices submitted in
previous periods. There are three possibilities: First, you may publicly announce the entire
vector of submitted prices. Second, announce only the winning bid. Finally, you can
announce only which firm won, without giving any information about submitted prices.
Which policy should you opt for?
In this paper we investigate this question experimentally. In the basic game two
players simultaneously make bids which are integers between 2 and 100. These bids can be
thought of as profit levels or prices requested by two competing firms to perform some
task desired by a procurement agency. The firm who bids the lowest number gets a dollar
amount times the number (s)he bids and the other firm gets 0. Ties get split. These payoffs
reflect the idea that the lowest bidder "wins the contract". This game has a unique Nash
equilibrium in which each player submits a bid of 2 and gets a payoff of only 1 (times a
dollar amount). This equilibrium is strict and it can be given a strong decision-theoretic
justification since a bid of 2 is the unique rationalizable strategy (Bernheim 1984, Pearce
1984) of the game.1
                                                       
1 Three comments about this game and its solution: (i) The assumption that the range of prices is bounded
from above is realistic since it is clear that the government will not (can not) pay an infinite amount of
money for the job. (ii) In a finite two-player game, a strategy is rationalizable iff it survives iterated2
We wish to investigate whether this sharp prediction stands up in a laboratory test.
We are primarily interested in the behavior of experienced participants, since in reality
competitors for a procurement contract typically are experienced. Hence, we must let
participants play the game several times. The most common method for catering for
experience in experimental economics is to let a fixed group of participants interact over
and over again. However, a drawback with this approach is that a confounding effect is
introduced. Since the same firms interact repeatedly, opportunities for cooperation of the
kind studied in the theory of repeated games may be created (see Pearce (1992) for a
general overview, and Friedman (1977) for the application to games that bear a
resemblance to ours). We wish to test the model described in the previous paragraph as it
stands, and yet to allow for experience while avoiding repeated game effects. We attempt
to achieve this by using a random matching scheme such that participants play the game
several times but typically not facing the same rivals in each period. In the terminology of
Jackson & Kalai (1997) our design approximates interaction in  recurring games, as
opposed to repeated ones.
Harking back to the story of the government contractor, this is where the issue of
information feedback crops up. Since each firm interacts more than once, a history of
prices will exist. This history may or may not be public information, and it is possible that
this is controlled by the government contractor. In this experiment, we investigate how
                                                                                                                                                                    
elimination of strictly dominated strategies. If for each player a unique strategy does so, the corresponding
profile must be the game's unique Nash equilibrium which furthermore is strict. In our game, a bid of 100
is strictly dominated by a mixed strategy giving almost all weight to 99, and very low but positive weight
to 2. Repeated analogous arguments reveal that 2 is the unique strategy surviving iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies, and the desired conclusions follow. (iii) We do not include (the per se
reasonable) choices 0 and 1 in the strategy sets since this would eliminate the uniqueness of the theoretical
prediction while in terms of economic intuition little would change (all equilibria entail small profits).3
important this matter is, and we have three treatments which differ in terms of the
availability of information about historic prices. In the first treatment—full information—
we publicly announce the entire vector of submitted bids at the end of each period. In the
second treatment—semi-information—we announce only the winning bids. In the third
treatment—no information—we announce at the end of each period only which
participant won. It is crucial to note that the theoretical prediction, described above, is
invariant to the information condition.
Our study overlaps with Dufwenberg & Gneezy (2000) on the full information
treatment, and the results should be viewed as complementary. Both these studies deal
with the same game and random matching set-up, but the investigation proceeds along
different dimensions as Dufwenberg & Gneezy (given full information) consider the effect
of increasing the number of competitors beyond two. It is shown that bids converge
towards the Nash equilibrium with low profit when the number of competitors is three or
four, but that bids remain much higher when only two firms are matched. See Baye &
Morgan (1999) for an analysis of how these results may be accounted for theoretically.
Our old results on market concentration and our new results on the role of information
feedback may be combined to yield insights about optimal procurement auction design.
The random matching set-up used here and in Dufwenberg & Gneezy (2000)
distinguishes these studies crucially from most other experimental studies of price
competition, because the usual approach is to consider repeated interaction among a fixed
group of firms. In such a setting, informational issues of various kinds (for example,
information about cost structures or signals of future prices) have been investigated, but
not the effect of information about historic strategic choices. The classic contribution is4
Fouraker & Siegel (1963), and a collection of relevant other references include Dolbear et
al (1968), Selten & Berg (1970), Hoggatt, Friedman & Gill (1976), Friedman & Hoggatt
(1980), Grether & Plott (1984), Holt & Davis (1990), Cason (1994, 1995), Cason &
Davis (1995), Mason & Phillips (1997), Gneezy & Nagel (1999). For overviews of some
of the literature mentioned here, see Plott (1982, 1989) and Holt (1995). Two other
studies of somewhat related games which, however, are not conceptualized as price
competition games are Nagel's (1995) "guessing game" and Capra et al's (1999)
investigation of the "travelers' dilemma". The last study uses random matching pairings.
In the next section we describe the experimental procedure. Section 3 reports the
results. Section 4 contains a discussion. We describe a phenomenon of price signaling that
may be important for explaining the results, and we close the paper by including a
recommendation concerning optimal procurement design for government contractors.
2. Experimental procedure
The experiment was conducted at Tilburg University. Students were recruited using an
advertisement in the university newspaper as well as posters on campus. The experiment
consisted of three treatments with two sessions per treatment. The number of bidders was
12 in all sessions and an extra student assisted us. That is, in total, 72 students
participated. Each session operated for 10 periods. In each period six pairs of participants
were grouped together according to a random matching scheme, and then each pair played
the above game.
In treatment F (full information feedback), participants were informed at the end of
each period about the entire bid vector (that is, about all 12 bids). In treatment S (semi-full5
information feedback), only the vector of winning bids were communicated to the
participants. In treatment N (no information feedback), participants were informed only
about their personal payoff at the end of the period.
In each session, after all 13 students entered the experimental room, they received
a standard-type introduction, and were told that they would be paid 7.5 Dutch guilders
(f7.5) for showing up.2 Then, they took an envelope at random from a box which
contained 13 envelopes. 12 of the envelopes contained numbers (A1,..,A12). These
numbers were called "registration numbers". One envelope was labeled "Monitor", and
determined who was the person who assisted us and checked that we did not cheat.3 We
asked the participants not to show their registration number to the other students.
Each participant then received the instructions for the experiment (see the
Appendix), and ten coupons numbered 1, 2,..., 10. After reading the instructions and
asking questions (privately), each participant was asked to fill out the first coupon with
her registration number and bid for period 1. The bids had to be between 2 to 100
"points", with 100 points being worth f5. Participants were asked  to fold the coupon, and
put it in a box carried by the assistant. The assistant randomly took two coupons out of
the box and gave them to the experimenter. In treatment F (sessions F1 and F2), the
experimenter announced the registration number on each of the two coupons and the
respective bids. If one bid was larger than the other, the experimenter announced that the
low bid won the same amount of points as she bid, and the other bidder won 0 points. If
the bids were equal the experimenter announced a tie, and said that each bidder won one
                                                       
2 At the time of the experiment, $1=f1.7.
3 That person was paid the average of all other subjects participating in that session.6
half of the bid. The assistant wrote this on a blackboard such that all the participants could
see it for the rest of the experiment. Then the assistant took out another two coupons
randomly, the experimenter announced their content, and the assistant wrote it on the
blackboard. The same procedure was carried out for all the 12 coupons. Then the
subsequent periods were conducted the same way. After period 10 payoffs were summed
up, and participants were paid privately.
Treatment S (sessions S1 and S2) was carried out the same way except that the
experimenter did not announce the losing bids. Treatment N (sessions N1 and N2), was
carried out the same way except that the experimenter did not announce bids at all (and
hence only communicated the registration number(s) corresponding to the lowest bid for
each matched pair).
3. Experimental results
The raw data of the respective sessions are presented in Tables 1a-f, in which the average
winning bids and the average bids are also presented. Correspondingly, the average
winning bids and the average bids are plotted in Figures 1a-f. We start with describing the
behavior in period 1, at which stage no elements of learning or experience exist. From
observation of the data it is clearly seen that the outcome predicted by theory was not
achieved in this period.
The average bid (winning bid) was 33.5 (29.7) and 41.8 (23) in sessions 1F and 2F
respectively, 31.5 (25.5) and 40.9 (28.0) in sessions 1S and 2S respectively, and 39.7
(21.0) and 42.6 (35.3) in sessions 1N and 2N. We also perform a statistical test of whether
the bids in different sessions came from the same distribution. To this end, we consider7
each of the (15) possible pairs of sessions, and investigate whether the two concerned sets
of observed bids come from the same distribution. We use the non-parametric Mann-
Whitney U test based on ranks, and cannot, for any pair, reject (at a 95% significant level)
the hypothesis that the observations comes from the same distribution (see Table 2). In
this sense, in period 1 the different rules in the different markets did not influence
behavior.
When comparing the convergence of bids in later periods, however, we observe
great difference between treatments. See Figure 2 for the comparison of the average
winning bids in the three treatments. In session 1F, we see a slow decrease of the average
winning bid from 29.7 in period 1 to 16 in period 6. From period 6 to period 7, a jump in
the average winning bid from 16 to 35.1 is observed. From this point on the averages are
25.8 in period 8, 33.8 in period 9, and finally 37.8 in period 10. It is clear that no
convergence to bids of 2 is observed. In fact, the smallest bid in period 10 was 19. In
session 2F, the average winning bid decreased constantly from 23 in period 1 to 16.2 in
period 4. Then, however, the average winning bid started to rise, and in periods 8, 9, and
10 the average winning bids were 38.2, 37.2, and 36 respectively. An interesting
observation is that participant number A12 in this session used a constant bid of 2
throughout the experiment. Of course, this bid of 2 was "strange" given the fact that the
next lowest bid in period 10 was 38. This bid was not enough to move the other bids to
the neighborhood of 2. Furthermore, the bids in both sessions of treatment F were much8
alike in period 10; the average bids were 49.6 and 49.3 in sessions 1F and 2F respectively,
and the average winning bids were 37.8 and 36 in the respective sessions.4
In session 1S we see a decrease in the average winning bid from 25.5 in period 1
to 3.8 in period 10. Bids decrease steadily moving from period 1 to period 10. The lowest
bid as well as the median bid in period 10 is 2. A similar behavior is observed in session
2S, in which the average winning bid decreased from 28.0 in period 1 to 6.2 in period 10.
The lowest bid in period 10 was also 2, with 9 out of the 12 participants bidding 5 or less.
When comparing the two sessions of treatment S we see that, like in the case of treatment
F, the bids in both sessions were much a like in period 10.
In session 1N we see that the decrease in the average winning bid is not
monotonic. The average winning bid fluctuate around its starting value (21) until the 7th
period, and only then it starts to decline. The average winning bid in the final period is 6.9,
and the median bid is 10 (as compared with a median bid of 29.5 in period 1). In session
2N the decrease in the average winning bid is more steady (though not monotonic), from
35.3 in period 1 to 6.3 in the final period.
Figure 3 presents cumulative distributions of the prices chosen in period 10 for
each treatment, aggregated across the two sessions for each treatment.
To summarize, the market outcomes in period 1 are similar across sessions. It is
also the case that in all sessions the outcomes converge, and relatively little fluctuation is
observed at the end of the experiment. However, while the period 10 outcomes in the two
                                                       
4 Unlike the case of first round behavior, it is not appropriate to use the Mann-Whitney test, because the
assumption that all observations are independent is not justified.9
sessions of treatment F are far from equilibrium, the period 10 winning bids of the other
two treatments are relatively close to the equilibrium.
4.   Discussion
In this paper we consider the design of auctions by a government which seems to have
very little power: it can only decide how much information feedback to give to the firms in
the market.5 The firms compete in prices in a recurrent competition environment. The
theoretical prediction is clear cut for all possible information feedback; firms should submit
the lowest bid possible.
However, when we test this model experimentally, we find that at the initial stage
"firms" (the students participating) set prices higher than the Nash equilibrium. However,
bids converged rapidly to the theoretical prediction in two out of the three information
feedback treatments. This was the case when participants did not receive any information
feedback but their own performance in previous periods, and when firms received
information feedback only about their own performance and about the bids of the winning
firms in previous periods. However, in a third treatment in which firms were informed
about the entire bid vector in previous periods, prices remained much higher than the
theoretical prediction.
Apparently, the information about the losing bids is of great importance for the
competing firms. An attempt to rationalize this result may be done in terms of signaling
behavior. The following intuitive argument is intended to be suggestive of what is going
                                                       
5 By contrast, the theoretical literature on optimal procurement typically considers the effects of different
mechanisms (e.g. Luton & McAfee (1986), Laffont & Tirole (1987), Piccione & Tan (1996)) or market
structure (e.g. Dana & Spier (1994), McGuire & Riordan (1995)), but does not address the issue of
information feedback in recurrent interaction.10
on: Assume each firm has two possible actions in time t and t+1 (when t is not the final
period). The firm can either "compete" or "signal". If the firm chooses to compete, then it
submits a bid which gives it the highest expected reward at time t, based on its belief about
the bids of the other firms. Alternatively, the firm may choose to use its bid at time t to
signal. Doing that, the firm bids "high" at time t sacrificing payoffs in that period in order
to influence the beliefs of the other firms in time t+1. If the firm is successful in doing this,
then it may expect higher payoffs at time t+1 than if it chooses to compete at time t.6
Clearly, this kind of signaling may be profitable only when the other firms can observe the
signals. That is, only in the treatment in which firms observe the entire bid vector,
including the losing bids, they will be aware of signals.
Note that if this signaling story is relevant, the tradeoff between profits in the
current period and overall profits may be more favorable to signals when bids at time t are
expected to be very low. Moreover, in the current random matching context, this signaling
explanation is not the same as the repeated interaction explanation in which firms are
assumed to collude. To construct a formal model of signaling may be a feasible research
task which could shed some light on how prices evolve in markets in which firms compete
in prices. We hope that the findings we report in this study will serve to inspire such a line
of inquiry. This, however, lies outside the scope of the present paper.
The experimental game we analyze has features reminiscent of both Bertrand price
competition and first price auctions. However, the prime interpretation we have made
                                                       
6 Observations of related kinds of price signals are made by Fouraker & Siegel (1963, pp 185-88),
Hoggatt, Friedman & Gill (1976), and Friedman & Hoggatt (1980) for the case of repeated interaction
among a fixed group of firms. See Plott (1982, pp 1513-17) for a discussion. Surprisingly, these
interesting observations seem to have been "forgotten"; we have seen no post-1982 discussion of the
matter in the literature.11
concerns government procurement. What have we learned of relevance for optimal
procurement auction design? Note first that the evidence reported by Dufwenberg &
Gneezy (2000) suggests that a government contractor may be well-advised to strive to
have at least three competitors in his procurement auctions; with only two competitors
bids remain far away from the Nash equilibrium, while bids converge towards the
equilibrium when the number is three or four. This result, however, was derived under
conditions of full information about historic bids. The present paper shows that even with
two competitors bids converge towards the Nash equilibrium if information about losing
bids is not disclosed. Based on this observation, we now return to the story featuring you
as a government contractor and venture upon the following piece of advice: You may
announce winning bids, but keep the losing bids secret!12
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Appendix: Instructions for the full information treatment
In the following game, which will be played for 10 rounds, we use "points" to reward you.
At the end of the experiment we will pay you 5 cents for each point you won (100 points
equals 5 Dutch guilders). In each round your reward will depend on your choice, as well
as the choice made by one other person in this room. However, in each round you will not
know the identity of this person and you will not learn this subsequently.
At the beginning of round 1, you are asked to choose a number between 2 and
100, and then to write your choice on card number 1 (please note that the 10 cards you
have are numbered 1,2,...,10). Write also your registration number on this card. Then we
will collect all the cards of round 1 from the students in the room and put them in a box.
The monitor will then randomly take two cards out of the box. The numbers on the
two cards will be compared. If one student chose a lower number than the other student,
then the student that chose the lowest number will win points equal to the number he/she
chose. The other student will get no points for this round. If the two cards have the same
number, then each student gets points equal to half the number chosen. The monitor will
then announce (on a blackboard) the registration number of each student in the pair that
was matched, and indicate which of these students chose the lower number and what
his/her number was.
Then the monitor will take out of the box another two cards without looking,
compare them, reward the students, and make an announcement, all as described above.
This procedure will be repeated for all the cards in the box. That will end round 1, and
then round 2 will begin. The same procedure will be used for all 10 rounds.15
Tables 1a-f: The bids in the different sessions
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8 Round 9 Round 10
A1 49 34 24* 22* 16* 15* 100* 100 60 20*
A2 15* 20* 25* 20 19 19 14* 9* 19* 19*
A3 39 39 30 35 40 19 100* 99 99 99
A4 40* 29* 28* 26 18* 16* 13* 80* 40 28*
A5 10* 20* 29 24* 19* 15* 14 100 79 79
A6 40* 30* 26 20* 21 15* 14* 19* 50* 60*
A7 23* 29 31* 24* 28 20* 14* 17* 40* 50
A8 46 32 24* 26 18* 100 20 35 88 66
A9 40 38 25* 25 20* 20 15 40 100 40*
A10 40* 40 35 19* 19* 18 40 39 35* 60*
A11 20 25* 20* 19* 17* 15* 12* 12* 20* 39
A12 40* 35* 30 23* 25 16 14* 18* 39* 35
Ave.bid 33.5 30.9 27.3 23.6 21.7 24.0 30.8 47.3 55.8 49.6
Ave.win bid 29.7 26.5 25.3 22.0 18.1 16.0 35.1 25.8 33.8 37.8
Table 1a: Bids in session F1 (full information feedback). * indicates a winning bid.
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8 Round 9 Round 10
A1 66 50* 33* 66 44 85 98 96 50* 99
A2 30 24* 33* 22 30* 20 79 50* 54 40
A3 80 70 39 39 19 26 59* 69 67 46
A4 40* 50 40 20* 20* 80 79* 76 66 42
A5 85 85 85 20* 20 15* 20* 70 70 50
A6 22* 28* 18* 18* 28 20* 30* 49 48 39*
A7 98 40 84 85 99 99 99 99 99 99
A8 20* 30 28 20* 18* 80* 20 40* 40* 30*
A9 5 17* 20* 17* 17* 16* 13* 19* 35* 39*
A10 33* 29* 27* 26 17* 16 79* 49* 48* 38*
A11 21* 21 21 21 18* 16* 39 69* 48* 68*
A12 2* 2* 2* 2* 2* 2* 2* 2* 2* 2*
Ave.bid 41.8 37.2 35.8 29.7 27.7 39.6 51.4 57.3 52.3 49.3
Ave.win bid 23.0 25.0 22.0 16.2 17.4 24.8 40.3 38.2 37.2 36.0
Table 1b: Bids in session F2 (full information feedback). * indicates a winning bid.16
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8 Round 9 Round 10
A1 40* 35 25 15 9* 15 5 20 50 50
A2 47 27* 13* 12 9* 7* 3* 3* 3 2*
A3 22* 27* 22 12* 11 10 8 6* 4* 2*
A4 15* 24 15* 18 11 9* 7 15 2* 14*
A5 19* 19 17* 9* 9* 7* 5* 4* 2* 2*
A6 37* 18* 17 12* 9 7* 5* 3* 2* 2
A7 48 27* 25 14* 48 40 48 48 48 38
A8 21 15* 17* 15 11* 8* 8* 5* 5 4*
A9 25 25 13* 13 8* 8* 6* 5 4* 2*
A10 40 19* 18 10* 9* 8 6 5 3* 2*
A11 20* 15* 10* 10* 10 10 5* 2* 2* 2*
A12 44 28 25 16 11 8* 8 28 6* 20
Ave. bid 31.5 23.3 18.1 13.0 12.9 11.4 9.5 12.0 10.9 11.7
Ave. win bid 25.5 21.1 14.2 11.2 9.2 7.7 5.3 3.8 3.1 3.8
Table 1c: Bids in session S1 (semi-information feedback). * indicates a winning bid.
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8 Round 9 Round 10
A1 24* 39* 24* 19* 24 16 12* 9* 9 4
A2 75 50 75 25* 25 20 15 10* 10 99
A3 40 40 20 30 15* 15* 15 10* 8 4*
A4 28* 12* 21* 29 19 13* 11* 8* 10* 3
A5 49* 45 48 20* 19* 19* 13* 18 8 2*
A6 66 20* 35 20 16* 15 30 10 7* 20
A7 80 60 25* 28 22 14* 19 19 100 20*
A8 13* 45 19* 20* 22* 21 18* 10* 9 5*
A9 22 20 18* 23* 18* 15* 12* 11 7* 5
A10 25* 21* 30 20* 19 10* 14 10* 8* 5
A11 40 23* 24 24 15* 15* 14* 12* 7* 4*
A12 29* 39* 34* 23 17* 42 22 19 7* 2*
Ave. bid 40.9 34.5 31.1 23.4 19.3 17.9 16.3 12.2 15.8 14.4
Ave. win bid 28.0 25.7 23.5 21.2 17.4 14.4 13.3 9.9 7.7 6.2
Table 1d: Bids in session S2 (semi-information feedback). * indicates a winning bid.17
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8 Round 9 Round 10
A1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
A2 35 50 95 20* 30 20 90 30* 80 80
A3 100 50 50 25* 25 25 20 10 20* 10*
A4 35* 30* 35 25 20* 20* 20* 15* 25 15
A5 30 25 10* 14* 19* 24* 24* 24* 24 14*
A6 23* 23* 23* 23* 23 23 2 2* 2* 2*
A7 2* 100 2* 100 2* 100 2 2* 2* 2*
A8 29* 29* 29* 50 29* 29* 29* 29 15 39
A9 12* 14* 17* 22* 35 32 25 25* 20 10
A10 25* 25* 40 30 20* 20* 20* 20 5* 5*
A11 60 49 20 20* 20* 18* 18* 18* 10* 10*
A12 25 10* 20* 20 15* 15* 10* 10 10* 5*
Ave. bid 39.7 42.1 36.8 37.4 28.2 35.5 30.0 23.8 26.1 24.3
Ave. win bid 21.0 21.8 16.8 20.7 17.9 21.0 20.2 16.6 8.2 6.9
Table 1e: Bids in session N1 (no information feedback). * indicates a winning bid.
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8 Round 9 Round 10
A1 100 100 50 25 10* 10* 20* 50 20 20
A2 29* 19* 11* 9* 7 5* 4 9* 7* 9*
A3 21 98 99 2* 2* 2* 2* 2* 2* 2*
A4 45 25* 35 50 25 30 25 20 2* 20
A5 39* 27* 18* 13* 11* 9 3* 4* 20 2*
A6 25* 35* 40 40 30* 30 30 20 20 20
A7 46* 46 35* 40 33 24 15* 20 15* 20
A8 10* 10* 10* 10* 5* 10* 10* 10* 10* 10*
A9 49* 48 39 20 10* 6* 7 5* 5 5*
A10 49* 49 46* 42* 41 49 30 70 30 25
A11 29 20* 24* 27* 21 23 19 17* 22 30
A12 69 37 25 15 8* 10* 8* 10 8* 10*
Ave. bid 42.6 42.8 36.0 24.4 16.9 17.3 14.4 19.8 13.4 14.4
Ave. win bid 35.3 22.7 24.0 17.2 10.9 7.2 9.7 7.8 7.3 6.3
Table 1f: Bids in session N2 (no information feedback). * indicates a winning bid.18
Session F2 Session S1 Session S2 Session N1 Session N2
Session F1 .00   (1.000) .29  (.7728) -.61    (.5444) .43   (.6650) -.89    (.3708)
Session F2 .38  (.7075) -.26    (.7950) -.12  (.9081) -.49    (.6236)
Session S1 -1.10  (.2727) -.23  (.8179) -1.39  (.1659)
Session S2 .38   (.7075) -.26    (.7950)
Session N1 -.69    (.4884)
Table 2: A pairwise comparison of bids in the first period across sessions using Mann-
Whitney U test based on ranks. The null hypothesis is that all bid vectors come from the
same distribution. The numbers in the cells are the z-statistics. The Prob > |z|  is given
between brackets.19
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